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In October 1991 significant changes were made to the Australian industrial relations 
system aimed at giving primacy to enterprise (decentralized) bargaining and introducing 
more flexibility into the system. It was widely predicted that the changes would adversely 
impact on the relative pay position of women and of part-time workers, in particular. 
Between 1990 and 1998, however, the gross gender wage ratio amongst full-time 
employees converged four percentage points to 88.8 per cent; corresponding convergence 
in the part-time labour market was equal to 10.3 percentage points. Decompositions 
reported in this paper show that the convergence in the part-time labour market derived 
from compositional shifts; the entry of less qualified and less experienced males into 
part-time employment. Wage effects, specifically the experience of faster wage growth 
for women relative to men, explain observed convergence in the full-time labour market. 
A number of possible reasons for the latter, including the potentially negative effects of 






In October 1991 significant changes were made to the Australian industrial relations 
system aimed at giving primacy to enterprise (decentralized) bargaining and introducing 
more flexibility into the system.  At the time concerns were expressed about the likely 
impact such developments would have on the relative pay position of women and other 
target equity groups such as part-time workers. A number of empirical studies had 
demonstrated a significant link between the size of the gender wage gap and the 
prevailing bargaining structure, with centralized bargaining typically associated with 
smaller gaps (Gregory and Daly 1992; Blau and Kahn 1992; Whitehouse 1992).  
 
Since the adoption of enterprise bargaining in 1991 the Australian wage structure has 
changed, although not entirely in the manner predicted.  Between 1990 and 1998 the 
gross gender wage ratio in the full-time labour market converged by four percentage 
points (to 88.8 per cent). In the part-time labour market the same ratio converged by 10.3 
percentage points (to 103.1 per cent).  Given the literature concerning systems of pay 
determination and gender equity these trends are curious, although not unique (see 
Bernhardt, Morris and Handcock 1995; Bruegel and Perrons 1998; and Bell and Ritchie 
1998).   
 
There is now growing consensus that the gender pay gap is a ‘morphing beast’ (Pocock 
1991: 1), affected as it is by a number of counterbalancing forces including: the 
institutional features of the wages system (as noted above), human capital considerations 
(Preston 1997); the overall wage structure (Blau and Kahn 1996) and patterns of wage 
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inequality (Bernhardt et al. 1995; Whitehouse 2001). Aggregate data, therefore, present a 
poor reflection of the underlying causes and trends of gender pay differences. 
 
In this paper data covering the period 1990 to 1998 (i.e. pre and post the adoption of 
more decentralised bargaining) are used to disaggregate observed trends in Australia and 
shed further insight into the debate over institutions (bargaining structures) and gender 
wages. A central question in the investigation is that of ‘male gains or female losses?’.  
Within the literature there is increasing concern that observed gains in the relative pay 
position of women have been underpinned by a deterioration in the economic position of 
men (Bruegel and Perrons 1998). 
 
Whilst the empirical approach employed in this paper is not new, a number of beneficial 
features of this study are worth highlighting. First, in undertaking a ‘within’ country 
analysis this paper overcomes problems faced in cross-country comparative studies, such 
as differing historical, cultural characteristics as well as other features of the bargaining 
systems (such as levels of coordination) (Flanagan 1999). The second advantage lies in 
the fact that the unit record data employed in the paper allow the computation of hourly 
wages and, thus, a study of part-time workers. 
 
The paper is organised as follows.  Section 2 provides a brief overview of developments 
with respect to wage fixing in Australia. Section 3 deals with matters of method and 
definition. Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 concludes the paper and offers some 
directions for future research. 
 
 
2. Background: Changing Australian Bargaining Structures 
 
It is well known that arrangements for the conduct of collective bargaining vary 
substantially among countries.  Important determinants include institutional structures, 
union density rates, political climate, ideologies and cultural norms (Flanagan 1999). In 
Japan and the US, for example, most negotiations take place at the company or workplace 
level.  Centralized bargaining is characteristic of Scandinavian countries and, throughout 
much of the last century, Australia and New Zealand as well. 
 
In the late 1980s Australia, in responding to growing pressure from the business lobby, 
embarked on a set of reforms designed to deregulate the labour market and decentralize 
the level of wage determination.  The first major shift in this direction came in October 
1991 when the Australian Industrial Relations Commission (AIRC), the peak industrial 
tribunal in Australia, adopted the ‘Enterprise Bargaining Principle’ (EBP) as a basis for 
wage fixation. Under this principle wage adjustments could only be accessed if parties 
reached (and formalized) an enterprise (union negotiated) collective agreement.  The 
initial uptake of enterprise bargaining was slow reflecting, in part, the prescriptive 
requirements of the EBP (Preston 2001a: 74-75). Additional reforms were introduced in 
1993 to further promote and encourage enterprise, although the next major shift in 
direction came in 1996 in the form of the Workplace Relations Act (WRA).   
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In a radical departure from the traditional system of collective bargaining in Australia, the 
WRA introduced, for the first time in the Federal jurisdiction, the option of individual 
bargaining (in the form of Australian Workplace Agreements (AWAs)). Although 
primacy was given to enterprise (collective) bargaining (which, by now could also be 
without unions) the option of individual bargaining legitimized individual level 
negotiation over employment conditions and wages (Creighton and Stewart 2000, cited in 
Deery, Plowman, Walsh and Brown 2001: 285).  
 
In seeking to affect (limit) the bargaining scope and give primacy to enterprise bargaining 
the WRA reduced the scope of Awards (traditional instruments for regulating the 
employment relationship) to 20 allowable matters, relegated the Award system to a set of 
minimum ‘safety-net’ standards to be improved upon via enterprise bargaining, and 
removed the requirement for a public interest test on certified agreements coming before 
the AIRC for registration (Deery et al 2001: 259-261). (Two state jurisdictions, Victoria 
and Western Australia had earlier (1992 and 1993, respectively) introduced individual 
level bargaining and other reforms to deregulate the labour market. 
 
By the end of the 1990s the Australian bargaining system was highly fragmented and 
wage negotiations occurred at a variety of levels (see Table 1). Just under a quarter of the 
total workforce (23.2 per cent) were entirely reliant on the Award and, thus, the 
determinations of the AIRC for their wage outcomes and adjustments. A substantial 
proportion of employees (36.8 per cent) relied on collective bargaining (with outcomes 
detailed in collective agreements) for the fixation of their wages. Limited use was made 
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 Proportion of Employees (%) 
Males     
  Full-time employees 12.4 37.5 50.1 100.0 
 Part-time employees 37.4 33.3 29.3 100.0 
 All employees 16.8 36.7 46.5 100.0 
Females     
 Full-time employees 19.9 38.3 41.8 100.0 
 Part-time employees 40.8 35.1 24.1 100.0 
 All employees 29.9 36.8 33.3 100.0 
Persons     
 Full-time employees 15.3 37.8 47.0 100.0 
 Part-time employees 39.9 34.6 25.5 100.0 
 All employees 23.2 36.8 40.0 100.0 
Table 24: ABS Cat. 6305.0. May 2000. 




determining their wages under this instrument. Informal individual agreements, however, 
extended to 38.2 per cent of the workforce.  Many (possibly the majority) of these 
agreements would have been common law contracts, in other words outside the 
bargaining system (Peetz 2001).  A substantial proportion of the balance would have been 
over-Award agreements, informal arrangements to pay over the minimum rates specified 
within the Award.1  
 
There is a gender dimension to the patterns discussed above. As shown in Table 1, the 
Award (and only the Award) determines the pay for 29.9 per cent of all female 
employees and 16.8 per cent of all male employees.  The Award is also more likely to be 
used to fix the wages of part-timers than full-timers. As shown in Table 1, 39.9 per cent 
of all part-timers (men and women) have their pay set by the Award; the corresponding 
share amongst full-time workers is 15.3 per cent.   
 
Patterns of wage Award and agreement coverage also differ between sectors; 83.2 per 
cent of public sector employees have their pay determined by collective agreement. In the 
private sector the corresponding share is 22.3 per cent. Individual agreements (be it an 
informal over-award agreement, common law contract, or formal individual agreement) 
are more prevalent in the private sector, although interestingly, the penetration of AWAs 
(formalized individual agreements in the federal jurisdiction) has been highest within the 
most unionized sectors. Peetz (2002: 41-42) argues that the latter reflects a managerial 
strategy designed to weaken trade union power and influence. If trade union membership 
statistics are anything to go by then Peetz may be correct. In 2000 the density rate was 
equal to 24.7 per cent, down from 39.6 per cent in 1992. 
 
The significance of the above developments, as they related to this paper, is that the wage 
adjustments within in each stream differ markedly. While adjustments in the Award 
stream (as determined by the AIRC) saw growth rates of around 1.5 per cent (below the 
CPI), average increases contained in collective agreements around the same time were in 
the 4 to 4.5 per cent range (Preston 2001b). The markedly different outcomes reflect, in 
part, the will of the federal government and their insistence that “… arbitrated safety net 
adjustments not [to] act as a disincentive to agreement making”. (DEWRSB 2001: 98).  
 
Given the over-representation of women and part-time workers in the Award stream and 
the fact that the average wage growth rate within this stream has lagged behind that 
recorded in the bargaining stream, a priori one would expect the changes to lead to a 
deterioration in the pay position of women and part-timers relative to men employed full-
time.  
 
In the remainder of this paper unit record data from 1989/90 (when wage fixing primarily 
occurred at the national and industry level) and 1997/98 (a period marked by fragmented 
bargaining structures) are used to study the evolving wage structure and, in particular, 




3. Data and methodology 
 
In contemporary economic literature a dominant framework for the study of wage 
determination is the human capital model. The model may be stated algebraically as 
follows: 
 
iii VY ββ ˆˆˆln 0 += .         (1) 
 
where lnY denotes the natural logarithm of hourly earnings, V is a vector of human capital 
characteristics known to affect wages (e.g. qualifications, labour market experience, and 
demographic characteristics); and $β  is a vector of estimated slope coefficients associated 
with these characteristics. The latter provides a measure of the rates of return to the 
characteristics controlled for in the wage equation. (For a detailed derivation of the 
human capital model see Preston 2001a: 10-14).  
 
Equation (1) is estimated using data from the 1989/90 Income Distribution Survey (90-
IDS) and the 1997/98 Survey of Income and Housing Costs (formerly the IDS) (98-IDS).  
The advantages of these data have been noted earlier, however, there are some limitations 
which should be canvassed here.  The limitations essentially surround the extent to which 
comparisons from this study may be made with (official) published data from the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS).  
 
Hourly wage data published by the ABS are restricted to non-managerial employees and 
measure the common ratio of the weekly wage divided by the weekly hours paid for.  In 
this study hourly wages are derived using a divisor that measures total hours worked and 
the sample includes managerial and non-managerial workers (there is no way of 
distinguishing between these two groups in this study).2 The sample is, however, 
restricted to those with one job on account of the fact that the hourly wages in second 
(and subsequent jobs) could not be derived.   
 
Of perhaps more significance is the absence of information on when the hours were 
worked (a limitation shared by many data sets) and/or components in the total wage 
package. The derived hourly wage rate may, therefore, be: inflated on account of loadings 
for shift work and/or unsociable hours; or understate the actual remuneration level if the 
recent trend towards more innovative remuneration packages has seen the introduction of 
more non-wage benefits such as superannuation, care, housing and health insurance. 
Whilst these are acknowledged limitations they are, nevertheless, ones that are shared by 
all other available unit record data sets in Australia.  
 
 
Sample size and model specification 
After purging the data sets of observations with missing information on key variables in 
the chosen model and, as noted above, restricting the samples to persons employed in 




The estimating approach uses ordinary least squares (OLS). The Breusch-Pagan (BP) test 
is used to detect whether or not heteroskedasticity is present and, where detected, White’s 
(1980) technique is used to correct the standard errors. The set of independent variables 
(i.e. the vector V ) includes a three dummy variables capturing highest level of formal 
education (completed high school to Year 12 (highest level), completed a vocational or 
trade certificate, completed a bachelor degree or higher; the benchmark group consists of 
those who did not complete high school to Year 12. 
 
Labour market experience is controlled for via the traditional Mincer (1974) proxy 
approach which measures potential experience as age minus years of schooling minus 5 
(assumed age when schooling commenced). It is entered in the model in the quadratic 
form. In the literature it is generally acknowledged that this measure is a poor proxy for 
female labour market experience on account of their intermittent labour market activity. 
It is also acknowledged that it is an increasingly poor proxy for male labour market 
experience given their changing patterns of employment. Given these limitations, and in 
particular those related to female experience patterns, additional controls in the form of 
marital status (two dummies, one controlling for marriage and another capturing those 
who are either widowed/separated/divorced, with the never married forming the 
benchmark group) and children (equal to 1 if the individual has children) dummies are 
also entered into the model.  These controls help capture some of the labour market 
interruptions that women face on account of marriage and family responsibilities. Other 
determinants known to affect wages and controlled for in this study include birthplace 
(equal to 1 if the individual was born overseas) and geographic location (equal to 1 if 
individual lives in a city or metropolitan area).  
 
Following Wooden (1999) a series of hour-related dummy variables are also included to 
capture any effect of unpaid overtime hours on observed wages (one dummy captures the 
effects on wages of working 45-49 hours per week; a second captures the effect of every 
long hours (50 or more hours per week) and a third measures the effect on very short 
hours of work (less than 10 hours per week).  Whilst the inclusion of hours of work as an 
explanatory variable may generate a spurious result in that the dependent variable is 
constructed using hours of work, the literature does demonstrate the importance of 
controlling for long and short hours of work (see Preston 1997; and Wooden 1999).  
 
Method 
Pooled equations using the above model specification are estimated with additional 
dummy variables capturing gender and employment status (full-time / part-time) 
included. The results from this stage are reported in Table 2 and discussed below.  The 
models are also estimated separately for four groups of employees: women employed 
full-time; men employed full-time; women employed part-time and men employed part-
time. In total there are eight sets of results (four for each time period). Following an 
approach previously used by Blau and Kahn (1997:29) these results are then employed to 
study the separate role played by compositional (human capital) shifts and wage effects 
in  the production of changed wage relativities.  In other words, the approach allows us to 
ask the question: ‘If the composition of the workforce in 1990 had remained unchanged 
what might the wage relativities look like in 1998 and how, if at all, would they differ 
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from relativities prevailing in 1990?’.  The answer to the latter shows the extent to which 
wage effects (unrelated to changing human capital returns) have affected the changing 
wage structure over the 1990s.  The human-capital constant (or composition-constant) 
predicted average wage is estimated by combining the coefficients ( iβ̂ ) estimated from 
the 1998 wage equation with the measured characteristics or means ( iV ) from the 
equivalent 1990 wage equation. One may similarly examine the separate contribution of 
compositional shifts to movements in the wage structure by holding the rates of return 
constant at 1990 levels. The results from this exercise (reported in Table 3) are also 
discussed below.  
 
 
3. Results & Discussion 
 
The estimates derived from an estimation of the wage equation as specified at equation 
(1) above are recorded in Table 2.  Whilst the explanatory power of the model is 
relatively low (equal to 17.9 per cent in 1998) it is noteworthy that such power is 
observed in other similar studies, as is the pattern of falling explanatory power, down 
from 26.5 per cent in 1990 (see Le and Miller, 2001: 39). 
 
In both periods studied (1990 and 1998) the education, labour market experience, hours 
of work, marital status, birthplace, are important drivers of observed wage outcomes.  For 
example, in 1990 degree holders earned around 47 per cent more than their unqualified 
counterparts; by 1998 the corresponding premium had fallen 6 percentage points to 41 
per cent (a statistically significant change). Persons residing in the metropolitan area earn 
around six per cent more than their rural and regional counterparts. Marriage is similarly 
associated with a wage premium, which in 1990 was 11.6 per cent. By 1998 the premium 
had fallen 3.8 percentage points to 7.8 per cent.  Estimated signs on the long and short 
hour dummy variables are also consistent with other studies, with long hours of work 
attracting a wage penalty and short hours of work a wage premium (e.g. Preston 1997; 
and Wooden 1999).  
 
The results also illustrate the presence of significant wage gaps, although relative to men 
employed full-time the pay position of women appears to have improved.  In Table 2 
dummy variables controlling for gender and employment status (part-time / full-time) 
provide a measure of the adjusted wage gaps relative to males employed full-time.3  In 
1998, for example, the adjusted gender wage gap in the full-time labour market was equal 
to 10.1 per cent, significantly lower than the 13 percentage point gap recorded in 1990. 
Similarly, in 1990 women employed part-time earned 14.5 per cent less than men 
employed full-time; by 1998 this gap was equal to 7.4 per cent. In both periods the 





TABLE 2: Australia 1990 & 1998 ‘Main Job’ Wage Equations (dependent variable: ln(hourly earnings)) 
  1 – 1990 2 – 1998 3 – 1990 4 - 1998 
  Coeff. t-statistic Coeff. t-statistic Coeff. t-statistic Coeff. t-statistic
Female-employed full-time -0.130 (18.710) -0.101 (8.318) a a a a 
Male-employed part-time -0.015 (0.540) -0.064 (1.932) a a a a 
Female-employed part-time -0.145 (5.147) -0.074 (2.028) a a a a 
Part-time employee a a a a -0.089 (9.070) -0.081 (5.499)
Highest level of Education  
   High school (Year 12) 0.118 (11.491) 0.086 (3.570) 0.126 (12.077) 0.071 (2.913)
   Vocational Certificate 0.205 (26.113) 0.160 (11.636) 0.209 (26.345) 0.169 (12.315)
   Bachelor Degree (or Higher) 0.469 (41.074) 0.409 (25.084) 0.471 40.532 0.403 (24.614)
Labour Market Experience  
   Potential experience 0.029 (26.018) 0.029 (13.803) 0.029 (25.284) 0.028 (13.859)
  (Potential experience squared)/100 -0.059 (22.162) -0.055 (11.307) -0.056 (20.839) -0.053 (11.155)
Hours worked per week   
   45-49 hours -0.037 (3.591) -0.011 (0.596) -0.020 (1.851) 0.004 (0.214)
   50 hours or more -0.050 (4.754) -0.053 (2.923) -0.022 (2.114) -0.032 (1.741)
   Less than 10 hours 0.279 (9.386) 0.300 (5.770) 0.285 (9.566) 0.304 (5.833)
Marital Status  
   Married 0.116 (12.352) 0.078 (4.713) 0.105 (11.133) 0.071 (4.282)
   Widowed, separated, divorced 0.064 (4.215) 0.035 (1.432) 0.033 (2.169) 0.017 (0.690)
Has a dependant child -0.016 (3.231) -0.005 (0.566) -0.006 (1.222) 0.000 (0.001)
Born overseas -0.039 (5.189) -0.002 (0.134) -0.037 (4.824) -0.001 (0.110)
Resides in a metropolitan area 0.069 (9.378) 0.056 (4.589) 0.064 (8.578) 0.053 (4.373)
Constant 2.004 (171.251) 2.233 (109.661) 1.952 (171.536) 2.197 (116.536)
Adjusted R2 0.265   0.179   0.246   0.171   
Dependent Variable Mean 2.448   2.674   2.448   2.674   
Breuch-Pagan Statistic 1844.5   1161.6   1720.2   1109.5   
Sample size 12761   6155   12761   6155   
Notes: (1) a=variable not entered; (2) absolute t-statistics are presented here in parentheses; (3) the t-statistics are computed using White’s heteroskedasticity constant covariance matrix estimator.  
The reference categories for education and marital status are no qualifications and never married, respectively. The dependent variable measures the natural logarithm of hourly earnings in the 
main job. The sample is restricted to wage and salary earners aged between 15 and 64 who work for one employer. Persons with two or more jobs are excluded from the sample. 
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One story suggested by these data is that the Australian industrial relations reforms have 
not disadvantaged women in either full-time or part-time employment.  Indeed, in spite of 
concerns, women appear to have performed relatively well. Research elsewhere, 
however, cautions against, the benign story told by aggregate data (Whitehouse 2001).  
Decompositions presented in Table 3 are, therefore, used to further comprehend the 
underlying trends.  Discussion concentrates, first, on the role, if any, played by 
compositional shifts in the workforce. Thereafter attention shifts to the role of wage 
effects, in other words, wage adjustments which are unrelated to compositional effects. 
 
TABLE 3 
Australia Actual and Predicted Mean Gross Log Wage (main job) 





Males: Employed Full-Time    
 Actual Wage 2.512 2.732 0.220 
 Human-capital-Constant (1990 means) 2.512 2.701 0.188 
 Rate-of-Return-Constant (1990 coefficients) 2.512 2.541 0.029 
Females: Employed Full-Time    
 Actual Wage 2.360 2.620 0.260 
 Human-capital-Constant (1990 means) 2.360 2.582 0.222 
 Rate-of-Return-Constant (1990 coefficients) 2.360 2.384 0.024 
Males: Employed Part-Time    
 Actual Wage 2.463 2.585 0.122 
 Human-capital-Constant (1990 means) 2.463 2.690 0.228 
 Rate-of-Return-Constant (1990 coefficients) 2.463 2.416 -0.047 
Females: Employed Part-Time    
 Actual Wage 2.390 2.616 0.226 
 Human-capital-Constant (1990 means) 2.390 2.619 0.229 
 Rate-of-Return-Constant (1990 coefficients) 2.390 2.379 -0.011 
Notes: Human-capital constant predicted wages for 1998 are estimated holding 1990 means constant and 
allowing rates-of-return to vary (i.e. combine 1998 coefficients with 1990 means); Rate-of-return-constant 
predicted wages for 1998 are estimated holding 1990 coefficients constant and allowing means to vary (i.e. 
combining 1998 means with 1990 coefficients). 
 
Compositional effects, as noted earlier, are derived by holding the rate of return constant 
at 1990 levels and allowing the human capital characteristics of the workforce to vary 
over the period 1990 to 1998.  The results associated with this decomposition show that 
real wage growth amongst male and female full-time workers would have been fairly 
similar, equal to 0.029 and 0.024 log points, respectively. The story amongst persons 
employed part-time is, however, different. Estimates show that compositional shifts on 
their own would have delivered a real wage fall (measured in log points) of 0.047 to men 
and 0.011 to women. In other words, compositional shifts (in the form of lower average 
levels of education and experience) underpin the deterioration in the relative pay position 
of persons employed part-time, with the deleterious effects greater for men than women.  
Compositional shifts, however, do not explain observed wage patterns within the full-
time labour market. 
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The wage effect is derived by holding the composition of the workforce constant at 1990 
levels and allowing the rate of return to vary over the period 1990 to 1998.  In the full-
time labour market the decomposition shows that between 1990 and 1998 the nominal 
wages of men and women would have grown by 0.188 and 0.222 log points, respectively. 
In other words, female wage growth would have outstripped male wage growth.  In the 
part-time labour market men and women would have experienced nominal wage growth, 
equal to 0.228 and 0.229 log points, respectively. Taken together the results show that 
between 1990 and 1998 women employed full-time and part-timers (men and women) 
experienced nominal wage growth of between 0.222 and 0.229 log points after 
compositional shifts were controlled for.  The corresponding wage growth for men 
employed full-time was slower, equal to 0.188 log points.   
 
Observed convergence in the gender pay gap in the full-time labour market is thus 
underpinned by wage effects which have been less favourable for men. Table 4 helps 
illustrate this argument. In 1990 the common ratio of female and male average hourly 
wages was equal to 84.8 per cent in the full-time labour market. By 1998 this gross 
gender wage gap had narrowed by four percentage points to 88.8 per cent. If, on the one 
hand, there had been no change in the rates of return in the labour market the gender 
wage ratio in 1998 would have been 84.3 per cent, essentially unchanged.  On the other 
hand, if the rates of return were allowed to vary and the composition of the workforce 
had remained unchanged at 1990 levels, the gender wage ratio in 1998 would have been 
88.1 per cent, a convergence of 3.3 percentage points. The wages of women in full-time 
employment would have grown faster than those of males in full-time employment and 
the gender wage gap would, as a result, have narrowed.  
 
TABLE 4  
Actual and Predicted Gross Mean Wage Ratios (main job) 






















GWR (full-time) 84.8 88.8 84.3 88.1 4.0 -0.5 3.3 
GWR (part-time) 92.8 103.1 96.3 92.8 10.3 3.5 0.0 
Males: PT/FT wage 
ratio 95.0 85.3 87.5 99.0 -9.7 -7.5 4.0 
Females-PT / 
Males-FT wage 
ratio.  87.8 88.4 83.8 91.8 0.6 -4.0 4.0 
Females: PT/FT 
wage ratio 103.0 99.6 99.6 103.7 -3.4 -3.4 0.7 




Turning to the other relativities reported in Table 4 it is clear that wage and 
compositional effects underpin the observed outcomes. For example, the gross wage ratio 
of women employed part-time relative to men employed full-time (the benchmark group) 
is equal to 88.4 per cent in 1998, a 0.6 percentage improvement on the 1990 rate (equal to 
87.8 per cent). If rates of return had been held constant the composition effect would 
have seen the gap fall by 4.0 percentage points to 83.8. If the workforce composition had 
been held constant the wage effect would have delivered a 4.0 percentage point 
convergence in this relativity. As it was the two forces balanced each other out and the 
overall female part-time / male full-time gap remained relatively constant. 
 
In the case of the male part-time / male full-time relativity the large deterioration in this 
gap (from 95 per cent to 85.3 per cent between 1990 and 1998) has been driven by 
compositional changes. Male part-time workers in 1998, on average, posses less 
education and lower experience levels than their 1990 counterparts.  The influx of less 
qualified and experienced men into part-time employment also fully accounts for the 
convergence in the gender wage gap in part-time work. Whilst the entry of teenagers 
would lower the average experience rates, it is noteworthy that more recent male entrants 
into part-time employment are from older age groups; 35-59 year olds in particular (see 
Table 5), with many of them moving into casual jobs (i.e. jobs without leave 
entitlements) (Preston 2001b).  
 
TABLE 5 
Australian Part-Time Employment Shares and Growth Rates by Age and Sex  
November 1994 to November 2002 










% Change  
Nov.94-
Nov.02 
15 – 19 18.9 41.9 9.8 51.5 
20 – 24 16.0 57.2 10.1 44.7 
25 – 34 16.6 70.6 17.7 15.0 
35 – 44 15.3 88.5 27.7 21.4 
45 – 54 13.5 86.7 23.6 58.9 
55 – 59 8.8 120.2 7.0 118.7 
60 – 64 5.9 65.7 2.8 103.1 
65 and 
over 4.9 20.4 1.3 46.5 
Total 100.0 66.0 100.0 38.9 
Source: ABS unpublished data available from ABS Space-Time Research, Data Cube q2_aug94.srd 
 
 
The consistent story in all of this is that, net of compositional effects, the wages of men 
employed full-time have lost ground relative to target equity groups: women employed 
full-time; women employed part-time and men employed part-time. Why would wage 
growth amongst men employed full-time fail to keep up with growth rates experienced by 
these target equity groups? When considered against the data in Table 1 showing that 
women and part-timers are more likely to have their wages set by Awards than men in 
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full-time work, and considering the significantly lower wages growth in the Award 
stream, the outcomes are even more puzzling. 
 
The results may, as noted above, reflect data limitations. If the derived hourly wage in 
this study overstates the rate for women and part-timers (because of unaccounted shift 
loadings perhaps) and, similarly, understate the rate for men employed full-time (perhaps 
because of remuneration deals which see them being paid a portion of their income in the 
form of non-wage benefits), this might explain why wages of the latter have apparently 
lagged behind other groups. The data preclude further testing of this hypothesis, although 
it is clearly an avenue for future research. Moreover, the importance of this puzzle for 
many economic studies should not be overlooked. Surveys and models similar to those 
employed in this paper are at the core of many policy papers, such as those estimating the 
rates of return to higher education (e.g. Borland, Dawkins, Johnson, and Williams 2000). 
 
A search of the literature suggests some other potential explanations for the apparent 
slower wage growth rate amongst men employed full-time.  The first concerns 
substitution effects. If women are increasingly substituted for men this would raise the 
relative wages of women and lower the relative wages of men, although it would not 
account for the faster wage growth amongst men employed part-time. The patterns may, 
of course, reflect the results of decades of pay equity initiatives, including EEO 
legislation and job evaluations. Various submissions to the recent New South Wales Pay 
Equity Inquiry (for a summary see Pocock 1999) would, however, suggest otherwise. 
  
Two other, related, contenders not yet mentioned include deunionization and the decline 
in public sector employment. Blau and Kahn’s (1997: 31), for example, show that 
convergence in the US gender wage gap over the 1980s could be partly explained by the 
negative effects of deunionization on male earnings relative to female earnings. In Bell 
and Ritchie’s (1998: 345) study of the changing gender wage gap, a faster rate of decline 
in the male public sector pay premium relative to the female public sector pay premium 
contributed to a convergence in the UK gender wage gap.   
 
Due to data limitations it is beyond the scope of this paper to test these alternative 
hypotheses. However, it is noted that within Australia male union membership rates have 
declined the most. Between 1992 and 2000 male membership rates fell by 17.1 
percentage points (to 26.3 per cent); the corresponding decline for females was 12 
percentage points (to 22.8 per cent) (Preston, 2001b: 172). When read alongside the Peetz 
(2002) study on AWA penetration rates in unionised sectors, this deunionization 
hypothesis takes on even more appeal and is worthy of further investigation. 
 
Perhaps consistent with the above, official data from the ABS may also support a sectoral 
hypothesis, although the effect might derive from a faster rate of decline in the male 
private sector pay premium. A plot of the average weekly ordinary time earnings for 
adult full-time employees, disaggregated by sector of employment (Figure 1) shows that 
relative to male public sector workers, the pay position of male and female private sector 
employees deteriorated over the period shown (August 1990 to May 2002).  In the former 
the gap widened by 7.2 percentage points to 87.1 per cent by 2002; in the latter (female 
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private / male public) the gap widened by 3.6 percentage points to 71.2 per cent by 2002. 
The gender wage gap in the private sector, as a result, converged by 2.5 percentage points 
to 81.8 percent. Female public sector employees, in contrast, experienced a slight 
deterioration in their pay relative to their male public sector counterparts, with the public 
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5. Summary and Conclusion 
 
As noted in the introduction several studies have demonstrated an important link between 
the size of the gender pay gap and prevailing bargaining arrangements, with centralized 
systems typically associated with smaller gaps. The shift towards a more decentralized 
wages system was, therefore, widely expected to negatively impact on the relative pay 
position of women and part-time workers when benchmarked against males employed 
full-time. In this paper data from 1989/90 (a period of highly centralized bargaining) and 
1997/98 are used to examine wage structure effects following radical changes to the 
Australian wages system in 1991. Contrary to expectations the results show that between 
1990 and 1998 the adjusted gross gender wage ratio in the full-time labour market 
converged by four percentage points (to 88.8 per cent); in the part-time labour market the 
gender wage gap converged by 10.3 percentage points, delivering a wage advantage of 
3.1 per cent.  A decomposition to separate out composition effects and wage effects 
found that the observed convergence in the gender wage gap within the part-time sector 
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derived from compositional effects, the entry of (on average) less qualified and less 
experienced males into part-time work. 
 
In the full-time labour market the convergence could be attributed to wage effects, faster 
female wage growth relative to male wage growth. Indeed, males in full-time work have, 
over the 1990s, experienced substantially slower wage growth when benchmarked 
against all other target equity groups (women and part-time workers (male and female)). 
Data reported in Figure 1 suggests that this effect may be more pronounced amongst 
males employed within the private sector.  
 
As with other similar studies, findings in this paper suggest a need to rethink what 
‘women’s economic progress really means’ – is it “women’s gains or men’s losses?” 
(Bernhardt et al. 1995: 205). Further research into the effects of deregulation and pay 
decentralization at different points in the skill distribution, together with an analysis of 
deunionization, sector effects, earnings of multiple-job holders and components in the 
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1   Awards specify the minimum wage rate for each level (unskilled to skilled) within an occupational 
hierarchy.  
2  The hourly wage rate is derived as the common ratio of ‘total current usual weekly income from 
wage and salary from main and second jobs’ and ‘number of hours usually worked per week in main and 
second jobs’.  The hour data in the 1990 survey are grouped. The mid-point of each category was used to 
derive a continuous measure. The upper category (50 hours or more) was set equal to 52. In the 1998 data 
the open ended category of 50 or more was also set equal to 52. 
3  It is acknowledged that assessment of women’s relative earnings disadvantage via the inclusion of 
a dummy variable for gender does have its limitations such as constraining the estimates of the effects of 
schooling, labour market experience and other variables to be the same for both sexes.  However, as Le and 
Miller (2001) note, it offers an expedient way of summarising the data. Secondly, and perhaps more 
importantly, the approach yields findings similar in magnitude to those obtained using more sophisticated 
approaches, such as the estimation of separate male and female wage equations and subsequent 
computation of an adjusted wage gap which is net of any ‘explained’ components (see Miller, 1994).  A 
check was, nevertheless, undertaken. Using the dummy variable approach the estimated gender wage gap in 
1998 in the full-time labour market is equal to 10.1 per cent. When separate male and female wage 
equations are estimated across full-timers and subsequently decomposed the ‘unexplained’ (ie. adjusted 
gender wage gap) is equal to 9.8 per cent. This finding is consistent with Miller (1994) and supports the use 
of the dummy variable approach. 
